Human-Machine Interface Design for Cybersecurity Incident Response in Autonomous Vehicles

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1. Introduction

The design and evaluation guidelines synthesized in this work are aimed at HMI design specialists and security engineers and seek to cover. The research presented in this paper intends to address how the incorporation of HMI design in different stages of a cybersecurity incident response can leverage user experiences and support the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational cybersecurity actions. The novelty of this work lies in the synthesis of the guidelines through both theoretical and practical approaches, drawing from similar pieces of work and studies in order to present insights and recommendations in a mainly supported way. The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the results of research on relevant studies regarding the human-machine's interface design of HMI design for autonomous vehicles, aiming to address specific characteristics of the vehicular and autonomous fields of study, respectively. After the identification of important characteristics, those are organized into goals and contributed to the design and evaluation guidelines, presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 presents the main conclusions and ideas for the enhancement of future works.

The expected increase in the market and use of autonomous vehicles (AVs) has caused the security of these systems to be an important subject of study both in academia and industry. Recent years have seen the emergence of speculative works regarding multi-level security architectures for autonomous vehicles or incident response schemes to mitigate the effects of an attack on the safety of these systems. The human-machine interface (HMI) represents the principal means in which the user or security team interfaces with the cybersecurity incident response scheme, and still represents the main attack vector in vehicular contexts, as shown by a plethora of works focusing on the manipulation of traffic signs or the displaying of false reality to the vehicle's sensors. This paper synthesizes guidelines toward the human-centered

design and evaluation of an HMI to support security engineers throughout all stages of cybersecurity incident response in autonomous vehicles.

1.1. Background and Significance

This paper discusses the role of advanced HMI in data visualization methods for the design of cybersecurity incident response in AVs and future transportation systems. The involvement of human operators, such as cybersecurity experts and fleet operators, in monitoring, evaluating, and responding effectively to security incidents is a critical feature in the secure operation of AVs. Hence, the cooperation between human operators and the data visualization methods designed for incident response in AVs demands more human-machine interaction compared to conventional HMIs. Finally, the initial understanding of incident response in AVs may have broader impacts on human-machine interaction and data visualization in related transportation and robotics systems. The continuous sharing of responsibilities and cooperation between autonomous cyber-physical systems and human operators, under the guidance of visualized data that help human operators better understand AV operations in both benign and adversarial conditions, lead to advanced designs for future transportation safety and security.

As the development of autonomous vehicles (AVs) gains momentum and increasingly incorporates advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, computer vision, and cybersecurity, the safety and security of AVs pose difficult challenges that require a systematic approach. One common security measure is designing secure human-machine interfaces (HMIs) to improve situational awareness and decision-making for their operators for proactive responses to potential and actual security threats. Since AVs inherently collect large amounts of multimodal sensor data, the use of data visualization methods for enhanced HMI design can vastly improve the responsiveness of incident response for AV operators. Specifically, incident response refers to the process of analyzing, identifying, and mitigating security incidents with appropriate countermeasures to achieve incident resolution. In AVs, the efforts of cybersecurity experts employed by fleet operators are aimed at preserving the safety, security, and privacy of the passengers. Hence, incident response can significantly benefit from proper HMI design in order to ensure that timely and high-quality countermeasures are executed when security incidents occur.

1.2. Research Objectives

Utilizing aspects that maximize UX and potentially induce the exemplification effect, this research proposes to extend and optimize the cyber, physical, and physiological AV HMI to inform the HMI design with an initial system concept. Ultimately, user studies will be required to not only test the expected performance quantitatively but also to gauge how the proposed designs affect the receiver. Additionally, stress levels of operators and drivers under normal as well as abnormal conditions should be considered to inform the displays such that maximum useful information is provided, while otherwise optimizing the user deliverable according to the cyber, physical, and physiological costs. As Xie et al. points out, three dimensions must be considered to ameliorate the role of trust in human-machine systems. When the displayed information matches the user's conceptualization of the system operation, trust is formed. Providing information about the operations of these L2 technology to inform the driver is apparent in common vehicles on the road - family monitoring features, such as adaptive cruise control, lane control assistance, or lane assist, traffic jam assist, and automatic parking. In fact, traffic jam assist fits the bill perfectly. In slow, heavy traffic, the TJA works with the ACC to help steer, brake, or accelerate, offering a sense of confidence when getting around traffic backups. This sense of confidence about the operation of the system can rapidly develop into trust. There are market expectations for the operations of L4 and L5 autonomous vehicles.

The ultimate objective of this research is to optimize the cognitive effectiveness and trust in the Autonomous Vehicle (AV) cybersecurity user agents maintained on the operation of AVs. The goal of this research is to ensure that AV cybersecurity is efficient and effective, with a minimal cognitive load on the human supervisor. As previously mentioned in this paper, an interface must give operators an array of tools. The operator must be able to affect, use, and assess the current status of the system and, if necessary, effectively step in to help, take over control of the operation, or reverse a potentially system compromising action. If potential operators and/or users do not trust the system, then the investment in implementing the system is wasted. This becomes a significant issue with the L2 technology ADAS for supervisory agent driver. If the driver places too much trust in the system and something happens that requires the driver's intervention, raising the driving mode of automation back to L4 will be difficult.

2. Autonomous Vehicles and Cybersecurity

The consequences of vulnerabilities exploited by cyber events could be severe. They not only appear in terms of the safety of vehicles and passengers and in the safety of the environment but also with potential economic damage to the mobility industry. These industries invest huge amounts of money in commercial-scale software and hardware components. Recent research evidence indicates a significant interest in developing methods for reducing hardware costs by automating data acquisition and analysis, integrating vehicles as nodes in cloud computing, investing in security solutions that reduce data duplication, and reducing the time spent on data to optimize driving performance, business, and operations.

Although autonomous vehicles show great promise in improving the way people commute and conduct business, these revolutionary vehicles also bring with them significant concern about their future security. The increasing use of a combination of electronic systems for driving control, information display, environment perception, and connection with the external network through a wireless system puts autonomous vehicles in the crosshairs of cyber threats. The well-known Internet of Vehicles aims to facilitate road transportation of vehicles, but their entry point is over the communication wire. Attacks can be targeted not only on Command (C2) communications but also against vehicles and users. The potential threats against autonomous vehicle systems increase with the identification of vulnerabilities, including hardware, software, and communications, and human errors brought in by the "error window" of developers.

2.1. Overview of Autonomous Vehicles

An autonomous vehicle (AV) is defined as a vehicle capable of interpreting its surrounding environment using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, yielding actions to traverse from one point to another destination with little or no human control. This definition refers to advanced betas designed to be capable of steering control and monitoring on-road ground, and require no element or code remotely conditioned. It is worth noting that the self-driving term is used to refer to vehicles with a lower level of autonomy, with driving assistance and/or driver monitoring systems (autonomy levels 1 and 2). The concept of autonomous vehicle in broad classes has been discussed by experts on problems related to traffic jams, air pollution, and the safety of road users. Consequently, it becomes clear that reducing the weight of human decision is the premise of autonomous vehicle technology. The AV is a

computerized compact system with the installation of technologies for capturing, storing, transmitting, representing, and processing data continuously.

2.2. Cybersecurity Threats in Autonomous Vehicles

As a new and challenging area for the cybersecurity research community, the applications of autonomous vehicles have attracted attention in an increasing number of fields. The life-and-death problems inherently limit the challenge-driven approach of trial and error, which originates from traditional fields like optimization, preference learning, and uncertainty. The autonomous vehicles of this research refer to systems that can make context-aware decisions in real-time with different levels of automation. The Society of Automotive Engineering has established formal definitions for levels of automation ranging from privacy transport to personal guidance, which can be consolidated into three categories: partially autonomous, highly autonomous, and fully autonomous. Partially autonomous vehicles can perform safety-critical steering and speed control functions under specific conditions and notify the driver when conditions prohibit effective engagement, while highly autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles can take over the driving task as a backup under all conditions. Gudala et al. (2019) present AI strategies for anomaly identification in IoT environments.

3. Human Factors in Cybersecurity Incident Response

The main function of the guidance is to preserve the robustness that is designed into the core subsystem envelope as more detailed system components are created, improved, and integrated in a very large, highly coupled, co-evolving system development process. The user decision process will be receiving increasing guidance input as guided reliance is delivered. The tripartite issues in the user decision process are: (a) the quality of the range of partial situational awareness of the human, (b) the guidance provided to the human by automated content or tool, and (c) the SE orientation which can use the feedback to shape recommendations to provide support to users. The specific situation where the two elements are guiding the human behavior is a scenario used to evaluate, through human-in-the-loop experimentation conducted in a full mission context, the influence of various automation guidance input levels. The specific case was the potential hazardous collision between an autonomous vehicle and another moving agent which is traveling in a constrained, known path. The student drivers are being actuated in a cockpit simulator. The autonomous vehicle

contains multiple controlled components that are tasked with numerous vehicle functions, and onboard sensors that detect a variety of parameters important to these functions.

A vehicle moving in an unconstrained environment can encounter different kinds of cyber-physical attacks, which involve the vehicle's GUI. Relatively few human factor studies have focused on developing human-machine interactions that enable users to assess and understand new situations, systems or technologies. Studies contributing to the development or evaluation of decision support systems are also generally conducted in laboratory environments or in the context of full training activities, which themselves are a choice made in defined situations. We approach this general issue by designing systems that guide the decision process of the human users. The perceived need to guide the human decision process arises from both the potential complexity of the problem and vantage points in the development process.

3.1. Cognitive Load and Decision Making

In highly complex and potentially dangerous situations such as driving, the limits of human cognition can be quite evident. As the level of automation of a vehicle increases, the role of the human driver moves away from direct task management and operators become more like supervisors, whose active input is required mainly in situations where the system itself considers that it cannot handle properly. These events are usually unexpected or statistically rare, which means that human operators may not be sufficiently trained to respond quickly and effectively. In such contexts, interface design needs to be minimally intrusive but suitable for providing operators with the relevant awareness that is required for prompt and efficient interaction. These mismatches between a notifying system and human action are also present in vehicle safety systems such as Pre-Crash systems which are responsible for preventing perimeter accidents, and Collision Warning and Avoidance systems among others. All these systems require appropriate interaction design for the final success of the movement.

3.2. User Interface Design Principles

Uniform standards require different design tools and techniques to promote the consistent design of an interface. Logical consistency requires the same type of information to use the same display format or similar function operations for the same customer behavior. If the system only uses a small number of real-world factors, it represents lock-on. High tolerance

means information can still be obtained even under noise. This paper mainly refers to the necessary precision parameter information and the tolerance of display effects in terms of display information.

3.2.1. General Human-Machine Interface Design Principles From previous research combined with the specific application scenarios of autonomous vehicles, the user interface design principles for the cybersecurity incident response system of autonomous vehicles include general design principles, target factors, focus factors, and current task factors. General design principles include uniform standards, logical consistency, ease of lock-in, high tolerance, and essential information. Target factors mainly refer to the user's physical limits and cyber-cognition in the general sense, while focus factors mainly refer to important concepts, information, and operations of current tasks. The last current task factors are concerned with the current task-given operational target, providing necessary information, and giving feedback on the results.

This section presents the HMI design principles for the cybersecurity incident response system, divided into general HMI principles, target factors, focus factors, and current task factors. The following presents the different types of general design principles that are necessary to consider when developing such a response system. After the general design principles, the detailed application scenarios and design principles of each aspect are discussed to help provide better service for cybersecurity incident response of autonomous vehicles.

4. Case Studies and Best Practices

Data center management is one of the few enterprises where computer control decisions also impact the physical world. Machine-generated and machine-consumed data are both becoming security risks. A data center security best practice identifies and protects both of those assets. If they are not both managed correctly, a data center operator increases Net Risk, increasing the potential for a large-scale security event. For example, the XOR DDoS attack on the Kaspersky Labs website is an excellent example of the security risks posed by the Internet of Things. Botnets of infected routers, IP cameras, and video recorders were employed to mount the Distributed Denial-of-Service attack.

In this section, several case studies were described and analyzed to identify best practices. The team approach, developed by several companies designing autonomous vehicle control software, provides guidance on general-purpose human-machine interface design for this and other similar security tasks. Over 90% of incident response tasks require collaborators to be successful. The best solution in a timely manner typically integrates expertise from multiple groups. This model can be used to identify vital graphical content and workflow requirements for design and other similar collaborative tasks. Although an autonomous vehicle is not a data center, the case study illustrates recommended core data center/incident response practices.

The highlights from this paper were generated using Microsoft Word's AutoSummary tool.

4.1. Existing Human-Machine Interfaces in Autonomous Vehicles

The role of the user may also change depending on the system state, such as the user who is using the vehicle, the administrator who needs more privileged operations by managing and maintaining the autonomous vehicle, and the emergency response team who is responsible for controlling the system in case of an emergency. Therefore, the functions related to such a variety of roles need to be structured and presented according to the role. In this paper, the human-machine interface of the autonomous vehicle cyber response operator follows the recommended approach of the SA Handbook. The design can be simplified, with the roles divided into a user (A) who actually uses the vehicle, an administrator (B) who remotely operates the user's autonomous vehicle, and an emergency response team (C) that can operate in case of a problem.

As unmanned systems and vehicles have been increasingly developed and used, the technology and system have advanced. However, the users who handle cybersecurity incidents are not ready for them. In the case of an autonomous vehicle, since the vehicle itself operates and responds in accordance with a predefined algorithm and logic, the driver is often not necessary during the operation for level 3 or level 4. In this case, the role of the user during the vehicle's operation changes. For the actual driver and the administrator able to operate the vehicle remotely in response to cyber-attacks, the awareness and role need to be established.

4.2. Lessons Learned from Cybersecurity Incidents

Cybersecurity incidents can be regarded as learning cases in how CPSs are exploited by the attackers. Studies in the literature discuss the features of these attacks and how to respond to

such incidents more effectively, as well as the vulnerabilities. However, a concentrated discussion on what can be learned from these incidents, especially the features and elements of human-machine interface software that have been developed in terms of coping with incidents, was not performed in the literature. The study used a survey to summarize the information about cybersecurity incidents, in which human participation was also present, and to generalize how certain practices are constructed in security incident response approaches. The relationship between security experts and machine learning for cybersecurity incident response was also investigated.

Cybersecurity incident information from the literature and a survey was used to provide an understanding of incident response operations in cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as SCADA and the smart grid. Lessons learned from the incidents related to autonomous systems showed that the incident response process must take into account the control autonomy of the system and the use of machine learning algorithms in developing the human-machine interface for efficient cybersecurity incident response. We determined the most frequent step in the Cyber Kill Chain where the anomalies were detected in the incidents. In addition, when a manual response was applied in the response to the incidents, a machine learning algorithm was used to take clues from the manual responses and to automate its responses by learning those. Finally, prototyping was performed with domain experts for designing a human-machine interface of the autonomous vehicle computational system.

5. Proposed Design Framework

This paper proposes a design framework for accomplishing the vital role of the state-of-the-art that perceives the risk incurred from level 0 cybersecurity threats. This is achieved through interfacing expert controls and corresponding responses to an architectured, autonomous vehicle cyber-resilience system. By adopting the model, synthetic fuel consumption prediction for light vehicle engines and their decision-making strategies are used. The study results reveal that the artificial intelligence power of the vehicle controller can leverage recent advances in convolutional deep neural network modeling to create a resilient autonomous character design. They indicate the potential of this approach in the support of a movement towards reducing on-road sensitive vehicle digital and network exposure. This insight is directly aligned with the concepts of the Privacy by Design and Infrastructure as Driver safeguards in the cybersecurity community.

A description of the proposed design framework for an artificial intelligence-based environment modeler for an autonomous vehicle cyber-attack response system. A significant difference between the suggested autonomous vehicle cyber-attack response agent and other cyber-attack response systems lies in the potential delay of human response to address a cybersecurity breach in the system, which is largely due to a human-in-the-loop being utilized as a practical approach to enhancing the resilience and effectiveness of the cybersecurity system. In contrast to traditional human-in-the-loop approaches, the suggested cyber-attack response system is designed to be an autonomous cyber-incident responder that carries out predefined response sequences based on predictions of potential future attacks, projected cybersecurity indicators, and vehicle condition status. This results in the vehicle being capable of responding to a cybersecurity threat much more quickly than existing human-in-the-loop approaches.

5.1. Requirements Gathering and User Research

For this study, several methods were conducted to provide recommendations for translational guidelines for human-machine interface design and assist the overall design process. There are observations, interviews, workshops, heuristic evaluation, and survey/prototype testing. Currently, observations, interviews, workshops, and heuristic evaluation with domain experts or professional employees within a similar domain have been conducted to verify the requirements, preferences, and guidelines for human-machine interface design and the creation of design options and features. Additional investigations were also carried out to search and explore the related work or similar systems and to summarize the foundational knowledge that can support the design process and materials. Simultaneously, other insights were gathered through domains, functional forms, technologies, output contexts, and implications for autonomous vehicles and human-machine interfaces design within the literature.

This work aims to develop a user-centered interface design for general users who may have roles in cybersecurity incident response for public autonomous buses. Requirements development and user research is the first phase to gather the knowledge, suggestions, needs, issues, and tasks required for identifying and establishing the overall system requirements and user interface design based on end-users' activities, preferences, and cognitive

capabilities. This phase can guide the design process of the human-machine interface framework and direction.

5.2. Design Principles and Guidelines

Information ranking: Sometimes, it is difficult to present complex sets of information in a way that is easy to understand for all of the users of that system. In such cases, one should rank different sets of information according to their significance and priority of importance. Display the most significant information that affects robot behavior the most, like button colors - sapient vs. non-sapient advice, reliability, reliability changes over time.

Evidentiality: Reliability and source of every piece of input data has to be encoded into the functionality that communicates information to the users. If the reliability of a piece of input data is critical, it is important that the exact nature of reliability of that data is reflected to the user. The users should not only be made aware that "input is not 100% reliable," but they should also be aware of the exact level of reliability.

In this subsection, we present basic design guidelines for designing the refactored designs and interfaces. While a comprehensive set of guidelines would require a large design manual, in this subsection, we present a set of basic design guidelines that can help the user interface (UI) designer from any given domain to create easy-to-interpret and understand designs.

6. Evaluation and Validation

In conclusion, this chapter studies the HDLL from three aspects: building the intuitive management interface, providing detailed AO management mechanisms, and applying advanced processing and management technologies. The solutions developed have been applied and validated in a variety of important AO scenarios. The results show that the proposed HDLL is able to achieve convenient and efficient software-defined management and control, effectively overcoming many of the pre-existing limitations on the capabilities of Cyber-Physical Systems. This chapter also examines the process to analyze and design the autonomous management and cross-domain interdependency reasoning knowledge of HMMs.

In this conclusion, we provided an overview of the HDLL, ATO, and R&D process. This system provides the theoretical and technological support for mass customized AO,

combining various functions in a diversified or specialized way to achieve the physical interconnection and interoperability of various subsystems. HDLL and R&D provide the foundation for ATO design. The function-oriented design and implementation method then combine top-down and bottom-up models to execute logical, mutual verification. The information applied to define the function and architecture encompasses the identification code, language, and related logic; verification can be made via simulated or physical testing against constituent hardware. Finally, the ATO process was validated in various AO systems; the experimental results verified the feasibility and motivation for AO, network architecture, HDLL, and R&D. These results can be applied to civilian and military AO applications offering effective support and reliable solutions.

6.1. Usability Testing

The evaluation employed volunteers with a range of technical and non-technical backgrounds. The participants of each study were presented with a modified version of the Attack Display module that was visible on the left-hand side of the display. To the left of each Adversary Communication the scenario, sequence of attacks and time since the initiation of the attacks were displayed. Over more than half a dozen testing sessions, testers identified a wide variety of display design enhancement opportunities. During these usability test iterations, focused sessions were held to create specific elements to improve the HMI design.

The usability of the adaptive HMI design was evaluated in a sequence of three usability tests where the participants utilized the in-house developed CIAT to manage a series of simulated AVH cyber-attacks. The first usability test evaluated the Passive HMI in Isolation (PHI) prior to using the CIAT. This test setup only utilized the design with which passive system state information was conveyed to the user. The cognitive load of the study participants was measured. The second usability test evaluated the complete Passive-CAS-adaptive design. In addition to cognitive load, this study also quantified the assistance this group provided to the passive study group when they took a leadership role in response decisions. The third composite usability test employed the complete passive, study, and active users to measure the effect the combined group has on the overall outcome of a threat event. In all three usability tests, questionnaires and interviews established specific aspects of both designs that required improvement.

6.2. Effectiveness Metrics

2. Attack/Incident Classification Metrics: Once the system is trained, the classification has to be done for every specific incident type. The classification results, in terms of true positives, false negatives, false positives, and true negatives, make it feasible to calculate all the other effectiveness metrics needed to classify auto incidents/attack severities. It concerns each of the individual detection capabilities for a specific incident. A more detailed discussion on how that is achieved, as well as instructions and conventions specific to the classification metrics.

1. Accuracy Metrics: Generally, accuracy is the most widely used metric for classification problems. Accuracy allows us to assess the overall performance of a model in terms of numbers and is used to compare different classifiers or assess performance changes in a system over time. It is calculated as the division of the number of correct classifications by the total number of cases. It is important to highlight that accuracy by itself is not a good performance metric if the proportions of the data belonging to different classes are extremely imbalanced. In the Autonomous Vehicle application, it is equally important as accuracy for all classification tasks. Hence, accuracy metrics play a vital role in any classification, such as intrusion detection, attack severities, as well as the overall system effectiveness.

7. Conclusion and Future Directions

Although there was not enough time to apply the RSWs in an actual vehicle, the LSP experiment with the latest soft sensor technology was still successfully implemented in an indoor environment. Finally, in the future, the work has the potential to be commercially adapted as a complete HMI with more subjects and stakeholders. While the scenario is set as Stitched F and the number of subjects is set as seven stages of 21 people, which includes vehicle users, the number is pinpointed to less than 1000 at the highest impact level. The future work can explore different scenarios and user groups, including professional vehicle makers, vendors, users, and other facility managers of an officially selected stakeholders platform in a risk-based orchestration framework. They can be simulated in wider traffic situations that can help improve public transportation based on new data-driven decision-making mechanisms. This also allowed the selection of the most appropriate decision, developed by the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) and US Cybersecurity Administration (CISA).

In this study, we prototyped a multimodal HMI for CSV cybersecurity incident response. Although internal luxury vehicle environment constraints of layout standard required us to focus on designing an RSW that uses sound, vision, and touch modalities, all the other

components in the future interface have more potential to expand to a higher number of modalities for more effective feedback. The quantified results obtained through A/B tests showed that the prototyped multimodal HMI can assist vehicle users in a better direction. We provided 27 updateable specified multimodal RSWs, some of which are widely used in different application fields, while others are unique to the automotive cybersecurity domain. Our design principles can be considered useful for similar studies while the updateable functions can meet different requirements of daily-changing technologies. The designed tuneable components can provide to be an efficient reference point for future studies in the field.

7.1. Summary of Findings

Autonomous vehicle technologies are changing the traditional role of drivers. The role for human drivers changes depending on the degree to which the vehicle operates semi- or fully-autonomously. For example, an important role of the driver has been in deciding between alternative routes via manual, semi- and fully-autonomous driving, or passive monitoring in fully-automated driving. This study focuses on designing the HMI for the specific task of routing and interruption during fully autonomous driving, house evacuation as part of a disaster management strategy. The fully autonomous vehicle is treated as an autonomous vehicle that does not require the presence and attention of a human driver. GPS generates the routing information, a mission command specifies the end goal, and the presentation planning system creates the HMI interface for the control computer to facilitate communication with the ADS. This study identifies the most optimal HMI by applying a representative real-life workload measurement tool, the SpeedAvatar, and presents the specific insights generated from the study.

A growing body of literature is available reviewing the interactions between drivers and ADAS, particularly the degree to which ADAS operate semi-autonomously or autonomously. This study focuses on investigating optimal HMI design specific to the task of routing and interruption during ADS with specific task demands. This study contributes to the literature by identifying optimal interface designs for the specific task of ADS and assists with refocusing the role of drivers in the ADS space. We provide eight specific insights: modify timing, enable the re-routing of non-imminently dangerous EVs, maintain interaction continuity, indicate imminent changes in mission, automate the manual input to avoid missed

evacuation opportunities, reassure by providing a 'safe to re-engage' indicator, use traffic sign conventions, enable ADS confusion detection and recovery.

7.2. Implications for Future Research

Our research provides an HMI foundation that sets the stage for future design, validation, deployment, etc. This can be beneficial in comprehending which questions to ask in such research and in forming collaborations across disciplines. We have enforced, validated, and tested a collection of interaction design razzle-dazzle and stringer. We have introduced embryonic ideas about user decontextualization and make practical recommendations for how to best situate a research-grounded HMI in a world in which vehicle use is decontextualized. As automobiles proceed to move farther from driver control, over time it can be anticipated that industry cybersecurity and UX practitioners will attach together the collective results of the automotive design community. We have surfaced further lines of interdisciplinary communication that will hopefully engage HMI researchers and vehicle cybersecurity method developers in further research. By doing so, these ideas assist not just in seeing and describing what designers currently overlook about context in HMI and vehicle cybersecurity design, but also in identifying and pre-figuring future needs. Our results remind us that making generalizations is not sufficient in good HMI or cybersecurity design, and that creating useful abstractions is not enough.

The management and use of context in HMI for cybersecurity incident response is a research area that requires a more in-depth exposition, most likely via co-creation sessions with HMI developers and other experts. Not only is the decontextualization of users addressed during the soil saltation stage removed from vehicle cybersecurity research, making it more pertinent to practice, but it can also be used to ground the methods and design principles applied in deeper theories. We plan on continuing to develop this research through further development of the context-in-cybersecurity for automotive HMIs and key studies. Our objective is to engage with HMI experts and work collaboratively to move closer to the goal of a more grounded academic understanding of context. By the end of the HMI, HMI is situated in actual industry practice, assisting to enhance the HMI state of the art also translate insights learned in cleaner surroundings.

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